Chapter 9. Operation Horev, December 1948 to January 1949

Ben-Gurion attitude to Jordan and the Arab states

"David Ben-Gurion was still powerfully drawn to Judea and Samaria by historical-ideological and strategic considerations,1 but international diplomatic considerations dictated caution and restraint. Besides, the Jordanians had made it abundantly clear that they were out of the fight, and the Israelis still feared British military intervention should hostilities with Jordan be renewed. Zvi Ayalon, the Central Front OC, assured Ben-Gurion that it would take only “5 days” to conquer the West Bank or large parts of it. But Israel’s representatives at the General Assembly meeting in Paris, Abba Eban and Reuven Shiloah, weighed in firmly against.2

But the south was another matter. The UN Security Council resolution of 4 November calling on the IDF to withdraw to the positions of 14 October in the south vaguely undermined Israel’s geopolitical claims. The new resolution may have been illogical—it called for Israeli withdrawal from territory awarded to Israel by the United Nations, territory that had been conquered by Egypt in defiance of the United Nations, and then recaptured by Israel— but there it was."

"Since the 1930s, a deep pessimism underlay Ben-Gurion’s attitude toward the Arab world. Despite King gAbdullah’s real interest in peace and the (dubious) Egyptian overtures, Ben-Gurion, like many Israelis, was not hopeful, at least in the short and medium terms. Even signing a formal peace agreement with an Arab state, he feared, might not have a lasting or broader significance. “One must look not at decisions and documents but at the historical reality. What is our reality: The Arab peoples were beaten by us. Will they forget this quickly? 700,000 people beat 30 million. Will they forget this humiliation? One must assume they have feelings of honor. . . . Is there any assurance that they will not want revenge?”12 he asked. And the Arab states continue to reject the idea and reality of a Jewish state in their midst, he could have added."

"Gruenbaum also proposed that Israel formally declare Jerusalem part of Israel. Lastly, taking issue with Moshe Shertok, Gruenbaum opposed the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state in the West Bank. It would be ruled by the mufti or his allies and “would be a permanent enemy of the State of Israel” and a major obstacle to peace between the Jewish state and the Arab world. “All the aspirations and ideals of this [Palestinian] state would be directed against the State of Israel,” and it would always strive to expand westward— “against us.” Gruenbaum, like Ben-Gurion, preferred Jordanian annexation of the West Bank"

Atrocity in the Negev

"The Negev Brigade had been sent on its way by Ben-Gurion, who arrived at the Ninth Battalion’s assembly area at Halutza after adventurously trudging through rain-filled wadis with Yigael Yadin for two hours when their jeep convoy stuck in the mud west of Beersheba.29 A small flying column of the battalion’s troops, maintaining radio silence (they used carrier pigeons for communications), infiltrated south of the Egyptian lines and occupied two unoccupied positions at Mashrafa (the site of the Nabatean town of Shivta), midway between Bir Asluj and gAuja. Simultaneously, the bulk of the Ninth and Seventh battalions attacked and took, after a seesaw battle, the cluster of Egyptian positions at Bir Tamila, southwest of Bir Asluj. At one point in the battle, the “French Commando,” many of them ex–Foreign Legionnaires and Moroccan Jews, retreated from one of the conquered positions under heavy Egyptian fire, leaving behind, under a railway bridge, a handful of wounded. When they retook the position a half-hour later, they found that all the wounded had been murdered, with their genitals mutilated and their penises stuck in their mouths. Some had been blinded with burning cigarettes. The troops drew their knives and murdered a number of Egyptian POWs. Southern Front reacted by disbanding the French Commando.30"

Allon's offensive to Al-Arish: British anger and Israeli retreat

"Abu Ageila was not Allon’s real objective, though. He was after bigger game: El gArish. Its fall would close the trap on the bulk of the Egyptian army, in the Gaza Strip, and, no doubt, augur that army’s collapse—and Allon wasn’t going to allow diplomats or Yadin to stop him. Allon sent his deputy, Yitzhak Rabin, to tell Yadin that what was happening at Abu Ageila was a “raid.” Rabin did not mention El gArish. As he later phrased it in his memoirs: “I had neglected to specify our entire plan and confined myself to the capture of Abu Ageila. I had reason to believe that if I were to reveal the whole plan, including the capture of El gArish, the General Staff might suspect we had gone mad.”4

...At Bir Lahfan, as Allon contemplated the final push northward, a telegram from Yadin reached him and Rabin, stating: “I have learned from the [IDF] Intelligence Service and from [IAF] aerial reconnaissance that our forces have moved toward El gArish. . . . You are herewith ordered to halt all movement of your units without prior approval from me.” A follow-up cable read: “What is happening here? Stop the advance!” And a third cable: “I repeat and emphasize that I forbid you to carry out any operation north of Abu Ageila without my permission.”44

Allon boarded a plane for Tel Aviv. He hoped to persuade Yadin and BenGurion to let him take El gArish. Perhaps he assumed that by the time the deliberations in Tel Aviv were ended, the Eighth and Twelfth Brigades would have taken the town.45

The meeting with Yadin, at home in bed, around midnight 29–30 December was stormy. Yadin refused to budge. Allon said that his forces could and would take El gArish and then turn eastward, attacking Rafah from the rear. Yadin demanded that the brigades return to Abu Ageila. Allon radioed his staff officers: “It’s no use. Withdraw from El gArish.”46

It is possible that Yadin feared that Allon’s forces were too small to take and hold El gArish. More likely, he was moved by expectations of international pressure. Whatever the case, Yadin forced a withdrawal. But he agreed to allow Allon an alternative, to push from Abu Ageila toward Rafah along the international frontier, which could assure the envelopment of the Gaza Strip without taking El gArish

Nonetheless, Allon made one last effort: the following morning he met with Ben-Gurion (and Yadin) and pleaded that they reconsider. But BenGurion, too, refused to budge. Indeed, he went one better: if the British actually deployed forces threatening the IDF, Allon was ordered to withdraw back to gAuja, across the frontier.47 As the prime minister told the Cabinet: “There is a consideration that has guided us from the start of the operation: through all the war we have been careful not to face off with the British army.”48 The Israelis remained genuinely fearful of British intervention, given—as they saw things—Foreign Secretary Bevin’s “irrational” anti-Israeli “bias.”49

It is not altogether clear why Yadin (and Ben-Gurion) were so adamant on late 29 December and early 30 December about pulling back from El gArish; international pressure had barely been unleashed. But ongoing diplomatic moves—and premonitions of worse to come—doubtless played a key role. Following the IDF thrust across the international frontier, the Egyptians, on 28 December, had demanded the immediate convening of the Security Council to halt what they—with brazen chutzpah—called Israeli “aggression.” Previously, Bunche had submitted to the council reports condemning Israel for the impasse in the Negev as resulting from its intransigence over the Faluja Pocket. Now Britain submitted a resolution calling for Israeli compliance with the resolution of 4 November, which had called for withdrawal to the 14 October line. Egyptian War Minister Muhammad Haidar had informed London that the Israelis were “now within six miles of El gArish.”50 On 29 December the Security Council called for an “immediate ceasefire” and implementation of the 4 November resolution.

By morning 30 December, the Eighth and Twelfth Brigades were back in Abu Ageila. But by then, London was frenetic, breathing down Truman’s neck. Pressed by Cairo, Britain was insistent on saving the Egyptian army— and understood that the IDF had to be prevented from completing its encirclement. The Egyptians were panic-stricken and transmitted the panic to London via the British embassy in Cairo. Egypt’s leaders were “begging [Ambassador Sir Ronald Campbell] for war material.” They even asked that “British aircraft, tanks and guns with British crews but with Egyptian markings” be sent to attack the Israelis.51 Campbell opined that an Egyptian defeat would lead to grave instability in Egypt and that Britain’s position in the Middle East in general would be imperiled, especially if Britain rebuffed Egyptian pleas for help. The assassination of the Egyptian prime minister, Mahmud Fahmi Nuqrashi, two days earlier did not help. He was murdered by a young veterinary student and Muslim Brotherhood member, gAbdel Meguid Ahmad Hassan, disguised as a police lieutenant, in the Ministry of Interior building in Cairo, days after he had outlawed the organization. The defeat in Palestine was one of the reasons later cited by the assassin.52

In a series of almost hysterical telegrams, Campbell strongly urged London to authorize arms shipments to Egypt and to launch limited military intervention against Israel. Campbell hoped that this would force the IDF out of Sinai or even back to “the positions they occupied in [the] Negeb on October 14th.” Such action could restore Britain’s position in the Middle East, he argued.53 Britain’s minister to Beirut, Houstoun Boswall, concurred.54

But Britain’s willingness to help Egypt was hampered by a lack of information about the true state of affairs in Sinai; its own reconnaissance aircraft had not yet supplied clear photographs, and the Egyptians could not be trusted to tell the truth. As Bevin put it (somewhat censoriously) to Campbell on 30 December: “We cannot understand the Egyptian reports of the fighting. Public statements from Cairo represent the battles as Egyptian victories. At the same time we receive [private] appeals for help. The public here will not understand. Is it not better for the Egyptian Government to give the true facts?”55 Bevin agreed only to allow Egyptian aircraft to use Britain’s Suez Canal–side bases for refueling.

But he sensed that the Egyptians were on the verge of defeat. He instructed his ambassador in Washington to “inform [the] State Department . . . that if Jewish forces are in fact attacking Egyptian territory our obligations under the Anglo-Egyptian [Defense] Treaty would of course come into play.”56 And he followed this up with something still firmer: “I trust that it may be possible for the United States Government to act on the Jews as to make any military action by us on Egyptian territory unnecessary. . . . This can only be ensured if the Jews immediately withdraw from Egyptian territory. . . . In view of the aggressive use to which the Jews had put arms obtained from Soviet satellite countries we shall no longer be able to refuse to carry out British contracts to the Arab countries.”57 The cat was now among the pigeons.

At first, Israel denied that it had invaded Egyptian territory. But under the barrage of appeals and threats from London, Washington was propelled into action. At lunchtime on 31 December, McDonald, the US representative in Tel Aviv, was instructed to tell Israel to get out of Sinai. Shertok was summoned and told to inform Ben-Gurion and Weizmann that Britain had threatened that, unless the IDF withdrew from Sinai, London would be compelled to “take action” under the terms of the Anglo-Egyptian Defense Treaty. Washington, for its part, regarded the invasion of Sinai as “illadvised” and as jeopardizing “the peace of the Middle East.” This might require “reconsideration” of America’s “relations with Israel.” (By the way, the United States also criticized Israel’s “threatening” attitude toward Jordan.)60 As Shertok jotted down McDonald’s statement, “his fingers tightened around his pen, and his face was white with tension,” the American later recorded.61

By morning 2 January 1949, “not an Israeli hoof remained in Egypt”;64 the IDF was back in gAuja. But Israel was both alarmed and annoyed by the diplomatic démarche that had forced its retreat. It was being pilloried as an aggressor—and threatened with British military intervention—when it was Egypt (and its fellow Arab states) who were the aggressors, who had clearly violated the UN Charter and a UN decision by invading Palestine and attacking the State of Israel (and the British, to judge from their internal correspondence, clearly understood this);65 and all the Israelis had been doing since 15 May 1948 was attempting to drive out the invaders. Israel failed to understand Britain’s threats of intervention or to lift its arms embargo or, for that matter, America’s support of these threats. This was the gist of letters sent by Shertok to McDonald and Weizmann to Truman. The Israelis invoked the right of “hot pursuit” in defense of their penetration of Sinai and decried the inequitable treatment by the Security Council and the Great Powers of the two “invasions.” And, to add insult to injury, the United States and Britain were sponsoring Egypt for a Security Council seat while Israel was being denied UN membership!66"

"Ben-Gurion was unhappy that yet again the IDF had, at the last minute, been prevented from demolishing the Egyptian army. But he viewed the Egyptian démarche to end the state of belligerency within the wider Middle Eastern context; Jordan and the other Arab states, he was sure, would follow suit.70 Moreover, he was keenly attuned to Washington—where opinion was “dangerously tense, almost hostile” to Israel and where Truman was beginning to perceive Israel as a “trouble-maker.” Israel’s representative in Washington strongly urged acceptance of the cease-fire.71 On 7 January Tel Aviv responded positively and ordered Allon to pull all his forces out of Egyptianheld territory by 10 January. The fighting was to have ended at 2:00 PM, 7 January, but went on for a few more hours as local Egyptian commanders tried, to no avail, to reopen the route to El gArish."

Chapter 10. The Armistice Agreements, January to July 1949